

SOVIET Espionage Agent
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170016-5
STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, one of the most important witnesses heard by the Internal Security Subcommittee was the Soviet defector, Petr Deryabin, a former officer of the KGB.

Mr. Deryabin has sent me a communication with respect to the presence of a Soviet espionage agent on the staff of the United Nations.

This is a matter which I know will be of interest to many Senators, and I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Deryabin's letter to me, together with the attached enclosure, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OCTOBER 21, 1971.

HON. JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am sure you followed the reporting in the press on the recent expulsion of Soviet espionage operatives from the United Kingdom. This action by the Heath government is one of the most heartening things I have seen since I left the Soviet system; it was a service and an example for the entire Western world and would awaken revolutionary sentiments if the message could be gotten to the Russian people.

The *New York Times* on 3 October 1971 presented the facts on Soviet worldwide espionage, including the United Nations, where Vladimir Pavlovich Pavlichenko was singled out as an example of a Soviet State Security officer in the S & T field. This interested me because I knew Pavlichenko well as a KGB operative before I left the service.

On 8 October I sent a detailed statement of what I knew about Pavlichenko together with comments to the Editor of the *New York Times*, with a copy to Mr. U Thant. Given the seriousness of my charges, I even included an offer to be interviewed by the *New York Times*, regarding Pavlichenko, who by this time was attempting to brazen out by denials.

The *New York Times* published a small rendering of what I said which appeared on Page 60 of the 10 October issue, but the political content of my message was totally ignored. I note, however, that a few days later the *New York Times* published an editorial comment on the latest Soviet policy discrimination against Jewish emigration to which I referred in my communication. I would like to believe that my observations had some small effect on their editorial board.

It seems to me there is a disturbing ignorance or apathy about the massive intelligence effort of the U.S.S.R. In writing to you I am seeking relief by restoring to the only remedy available to a citizen. There is no question in my mind from what I read that the Soviets and the Bloc are doing everything possible to divert attention here and abroad from the real issues in the United Kingdom's action and in the Pavlichenko affair in the United Nations. That world body has long served as a spy nest for the Soviet and Bloc Services.

I do not claim to be a universal expert but as a former KGB officer, I am an authority on Soviet espionage and subversion and its personalities and methods. I'm still sought as consultant and have of course been in touch with former colleagues who have more recently travelled the same road I myself once chose. My sources, therefore, are excellent ones. Therefore, I believe that what I have to say on these matters should be made available to the public and to friendly governments whose *Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170016-5* Mission are unwittingly fraternizing with a

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

November 11, 1971

very dangerous spy. Obviously, I would have no objection, in fact would welcome your making the whole of my communication to the *New York Times* a matter of public record by including it in the *Congressional Record*, together with pertinent items from the *New York Times* coverage. I enclose the full text, and selected cuttings, for your consideration.

PETR S. DERYABIN.

P.S.—I have enclosed an exact copy of my communications to the *New York Times* but I think it would be prudent to omit the New York Postal address.

To the Editors of the *New York Times*:

Sirs: I have read with keen interest about the Soviet Government's effort to lie to the world in order to protect a member of their elite. I refer, of course to the case of Pavlichenko.

I was a staff officer of the KGB. I refer you to my book on the life in the KGB, *The Secret World* (New York, Doubleday, 1959), which is well-known to all counterespionage services and governments in the west, and also to Pavlichenko and his organization, the KGB.

Before I bear witness to what I know permit me some general remarks which I believe grow out of specific cases like Pavlichenko's.

As a man who left the Soviet system, I have been deeply moved and impressed by the Churchillian courage, (which came as a surprise to me after the appeasement of the Wilson regime) of the British Government in facing up to reality in dealing with the Soviets. These realities were defined by Lenin in this way:

"So long as capitalism and socialism remain, we cannot live peacefully: either one or the other will conquer in the end—either a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic, or over world capitalism."

Or, as Khrushchev said:

"We will bury you."

Or, as Mr. Brezhnev let us know recently at 24th party Congress:

"The organs of State Security (KGB) play an important role . . . they have been strengthened by particularly mature cadres . . ."

So, it is not only Pavlichenko who is important. In the wider sense, Gromyko is also a co-conspirator with Pavlichenko against the West and the Russian people in a cynical approach to foreign policy. The best evidence of that cynical approach appears on Page 665 of the Canadian Royal Commission report in which another Soviet intelligence officer and colleague, Gouzenko, recalls:

"There was one last conversation that Colonel Zabotin had with us. His was before the 5th of September (1945). He gathered us in this room at 14 Range Road and said, 'Yesterday they were allies, today they are neighbors, tomorrow they will be our enemies.'"

I am repeating all of these things because some people in the West have apparently forgotten the message.

As a Senior Soviet state security staff officer I first mentally, then physically, defected from the Police State. I could no longer tolerate, seeing the sacrifices of the Russian people, and at the same time indulge in the advantages of the elite. And this was not just a matter of personal comfort which included special commissaries, special department stores and apartments as well as advantages of every kind, reserved to the KGB and high party dignitaries and denied to the people. The Gromykos and the Pavlichenkos have lost contact with the mass base because they have chosen to continue to enjoy these privileges. Therefore, what I say is not just on my behalf, but on behalf of the Russian people, which is, believe me, the real silent majority in the Soviet Union. Pavlichenko, the Director of External Relations in the office of

public information in the United Nations, denied that he is a Soviet espionage agent. Said he: "The accusations levelled against me are slanderous and false, I do not wish to dignify them by any further comment."

I agree with Comrade Pavlichenko that it is very hard to dignify one's own belonging to the Soviet espionage service, especially nowadays, when 105 Comrades in arms in London have been sent home, except to deny it as slanderous and false. But facts are stubborn things. I remember him very well, Vladimir Pavlovich Pavlichenko. In 1952-1953 we worked together in Moscow headquarters for the KGB, in what is now first Chief Directorate (Intelligence). If he forgets, at that time it was called MGB and MVD, and it was located on Tekstilshchikov St. Later, it was moved to Dzerzhinsky Square, Building No. 2. At different times we had the same chiefs: Gens. Sergey R. Savchenko, Yevgeny P. Pitrovranov, Col. Asdray I. Raina, and Aleksandr S. Panyushkin, the former Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A. He and I have even used the same cover in espionage work. In 1953, in Vienna, my work involved me with the President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Academician Nesmeyanov and later on Pavlichenko worked with him. Today he works with Mikhail Dmitrievich Millionshchikov.

Sirs, I note from the most recent Soviet disinformation, which the press is unfortunately obliged to carry, that Victor Louis says Soviet "internal pressures" in the U.S.S.R. will lead to expulsion of British diplomats and other officials from Moscow. Such "internal pressures," believe me, are totally illusory, the figments of another one of Pavlichenko's friends and KGB colleagues, Vassily Romanovich Sitnikov, a disinformation specialist from way back whom I identified in my book in 1959. Pavlichenko knows Sitnikov very well and has worked with him professionally. He assisted him in 1965 in Moscow when Sitnikov used the operational alias Vassily Romanovich Sergeyev. And Victor Louis? He's just another of the same bunch!

Finally, in reference to the latest press, what can one say about a system that callously announces yesterday morning that Jews with special skills cannot leave the country. There is something of the cynicism and calculation of the Hitler regime in such a measure! But while the world may sympathize with Jews for such an abomination, I ask how much thinking is being done about the fate of other minorities in the Soviet Union—"our garden," as Elitist Malik called it? I intend to throw more light on the facts about that Soviet "garden" which flourishes in Russia and perhaps in New York. I am sending a copy of this telegram to Mr. U Thant.

PETR S. DERYABIN.

P.S.—In consideration for my personal safety and not for publication, I am prepared to be interviewed on the Pavlichenko facts by a responsible representative. You may contact me at the following address.

[From the *New York Times*, Oct. 10, 1971]
SOVIET PROTESTS ON PRESS REPORTS—MALIK
TELLS BUSH CHARGES OF SPYING ARE SLANDEROUS

(By Benjamin Welles)

WASHINGTON, October 19.—The Soviet Union has protested vigorously to the United States over recent reports in the American press of espionage activities by Soviet citizens attached to the United Nations.

Yakov A. Malik, the Soviet delegate, sent a strongly worded letter, which was delivered Oct. 13, to George Bush, the United States delegate, charging that the allegations were "slanderous" and reflected "anti-Soviet hysteria."

The sending of the letter was disclosed to qualified sources and was confirmed by Charles W. Bray 3d, the State Department spokesman, in answer

(2)

to a question. He added: "We will be replying in due course."

TYPED REPLY NOT INDICATED

Mr. Bray declined to indicate what type of response the United States might make.

The State Department recently disclosed that, since 1960, the United States has expelled 11 Soviet citizens attached to the United Nations and 11 more at the Soviet Embassy here on charges of espionage.

In his letter, which was in Russian, Mr. Mailk called Mr. Bush's attention to what he termed attempts by the United States press—notably in New York—and by other unspecified circles to "evoke anti-Soviet hysteria in the U.S. and in other Western countries by exaggerating notorious spy-mania."

On Oct. 3, The New York Times published an article based on reports from its correspondents here and in 20 foreign capitals citing evidence of rising Soviet espionage.

U.S. OFFICIALS QUOTED

It quoted American security officials as having said that many of the 250 to 300 Russian citizens in the Soviet mission to the United Nations or employed in the United Nations Secretariat are known officers of the K.G.B., the Soviet civilian espionage arm, or the G.R.U., the military counterpart.

The report specifically cited Vladimir P. Pavlichenko, who since 1966 has been director of external relations in the United Nations Office of Public Information, as a veteran K.G.B. official.

Two former K.G.B. officers who defected to the United States and live here—Peter Deryabin and Yuri Raastvorov—have since written or telegraphed Secretary General Thant to confirm the reports and to offer to testify from personal experience about Mr. Pavlichenko's K.G.B. activities.

As far as is known, Mr. Thant has not replied.

Mr. Mailk's letter did not mention Mr. Pavlichenko. However, it charged that the United States Government had a "responsibility" for creating "normal conditions" under which United Nations personnel can function. He stated that the Soviet Union expected that "measures will be undertaken" by the United States to create such conditions.

WORKS AT U.N.: DESCRIBED AS AGENT, RUSSIAN VISITED HERE

Vladimir Pavlichenko, a Russian working at the United Nations who was described by U.S. security experts in a recent New York Times article as a veteran Soviet intelligence agent, has visited Canada four times.

In spite of the charges, Mr. Pavlichenko's contract as director of external relations in the United Nations Office of Public Information was renewed this week for two years.

Earlier Mr. Pavlichenko termed "slanderous and false" a Times account of Oct. 2 depicting him as a spy for the K.G.B.—Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti—the Soviet Committee for State Security.

Mr. Pavlichenko has held his UN post since 1966. He first came to the UN as a translator in 1953.

The Times account quoted U.S. security forces as saying that one of Mr. Pavlichenko's key assignments is "to cultivate" scientists.

Mr. Pavlichenko first visited Canada in the summer of 1957 to attend the International Conference of Scientists sponsored by Ohio industrialist Cyrus Eaton in his home town of Pugwash, N.S.

The Pugwash conferences are designed to promote the exchange of scientific information between the West and the Communist countries and Mr. Pavlichenko attended again in 1958 and 1959.

On each occasion, Mr. Pavlichenko returned to New York via Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto.

The 46-year-old language expert, perfectly fluent in English, has a broad and firm grasp

of Canadian affairs, and of the country's history and geography.

A 5-foot-5 man of 150 pounds, Mr. Pavlichenko again visited Canada in 1966 to attend the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons in Toronto. He was part of the three-man delegation from the Soviet Academy of Sciences to the 11-country conference, although Mr. Pavlichenko's scientific knowledge takes a back seat to his political acumen.

Time magazine quotes U.S. security sources as estimating that from 50 per cent to 75 per cent of all Soviet officials stationed abroad are KGB agents.

There are 82 diplomats in the Soviet mission to the UN, plus 227 Russians on the staff of the UN secretariat.

It is considered to be of some advantage in espionage work to have spy operations within one country handled by someone in a third country as this makes counter-espionage work more difficult.

The New York Times article said that nine of the Russians expelled from Britain had at one time served in the United States. Checks here indicate none had served in Canada.

There are 82 representatives of the Soviet Union in Canada, consisting of, in Ottawa, 28 in the Chancery, seven in the commercial division, six in the military, four in the consular service, and seven in the press, and in Montreal, of nine on the Consul-General's staff, four in the trade office, four for Aeroflot, four for Sovlucht (the shipping agency) and two for Intourist.

THE 1966 MEETING

The 1966 meeting was sponsored by respected, well-placed and influential citizens seeking through understanding to prevent nuclear confrontation, and among the speakers were then Prime Minister Lester Pearson, Sir Solly Zuckerman, chief scientific adviser to the British Government, and Mrs. Alva Myrdad, head of the Swedish delegation to the 18-nation disarmament conference.

The Times' article said that Mr. Pavlichenko also has traveled extensively through the United States, Latin America and Western Europe.

The Washington Post on Oct. 5 said that Mr. Pavlichenko "reportedly tried to introduce girl KGB agents into the UN as tourist guides."

The articles in the two U.S. newspapers are part of a swell of recent news on Soviet espionage activity, including long accounts in the latest editions of Time and Newsweek, following the mass exposure of Soviet spies in Britain late last month.

The British Government was given an extensive rundown on Russian espionage operations by director Oleg Lyalin, 34, ostensibly a hard-drinking minor trade official in the Soviet Embassy but in fact a top-ranking KGB agent.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 10, 1971] RED DEFECTOR SAYS U.S. AIDE WAS A SPY

Peter S. Deryabin, a former Soviet secret police officer who defected to the West in 1954, charged yesterday that a Soviet member of the United Nations staff served with him as an espionage agent in Moscow in the nineteen-fifties.

Mr. Deryabin made his charges in telegrams he sent to The New York Times and to Secretary General Thant. In the telegrams he named Vladimir P. Pavlichenko, director of external relations in the United Nations Office of Public Information.

A report in The New York Times Oct. 3 said that Mr. Pavlichenko was, according to American security officers, a "veteran" officer of the K.G.B., the Soviet state security agency.

Mr. Pavlichenko denied the charges, calling him as "slanderous and false" and denied he was an espionage agent.

Mr. Deryabin ridiculed Mr. Pavlichenko's

denial, saying: "In 1952-53 we worked together in Moscow headquarters for the K.G.B. in what is now First Chief Directorate (Intelligence). If he forgets, at that time it was called M.G.B. and M.V.D., and it was located on Tekstilshchikov Street."

[From the New York Times, Oct. 6, 1971] RUSSIAN, CALLED SPY, WILL REMAIN AT U.N.

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., October 5.—Moscow gave its formal assent today to a United Nations proposal to extend for two years the contract of a Soviet national named in a report in The New York Times as a "veteran officer" of the Soviet secret police.

The official, Vladimir P. Pavlichenko, 48 years old, director of external relations of the Office of Public Information, denied the report yesterday, terming it slanderous and false.

A United Nations spokesman, who disclosed that Mr. Pavlichenko's contract for the \$27,000 a year post, due to expire Saturday, would be extended, said Secretary General Thant planned no action.

"There is no official information from the United States Government on the subject," the spokesman said, and Mr. Thant is not going to "dignify an unsubstantiated report of this kind" by starting an inquiry.

The New York Times dispatch from Washington, printed Sunday, quoted American security experts to the effect that Mr. Pavlichenko's job as a K.G.B. agent was to cultivate American scientists.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 5, 1971] HIGH RUSSIAN AIDE OF THE U.N. DENIED THAT HE IS A SPY

(By Kathleen Teltsco)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., October 5.—A Soviet member of the United Nations staff denied today as "slanderous and false" allegations that he was an espionage agent.

Vladimir P. Pavlichenko, director of internal relations in the Office of Public Information, was described in a news report in The New York Times yesterday as having been identified by American security experts as a veteran officer of the K.G.B., the Soviet espionage agency.

United Nations authorities had no official comment on the allegations, which they contended had not been made officially by the United States Government or its United Nations delegation. They told inquirers that Mr. Pavlichenko's current contract in his \$27,000-a-year post expires Saturday.

The United Nations asked the Soviet Government weeks ago through the Soviet mission to renew his assignment for two years, but the request has gone unanswered—a development one official said could be simply a Soviet bureaucratic slip.

Mr. Pavlichenko was in his office at an early hour today, but refused telephone inquiries, and through a United Nations spokesman issued a terse statement later in the day.

"The accusations leveled against me in the issue of Oct. 3 of The New York Times are slanderous and false." "I do not wish to discuss them by any further statement."

United Nations authorities said that in the absence of formal charges against the director, no investigation was being made, and a spokesman emphasized that the many trips abroad by Mr. Pavlichenko were explained by his duties at the overseas information centers. The Times said the American security officers had noted that Mr. Pavlichenko traveled often, became acquainted with scientists and attended the Pugwash conferences sponsored by the Ohio industrialist, Cyrus Eaton.

United Nations authorities said Mr. Pavlichenko, who is 48 years old, first came here in 1954 as a translator but after a year went home and later became Assistant Secretary General of the Academy of Sciences in the

Soviet Union. He returned here in 1966 as a deputy director and in 1969 was promoted to his present post.

His office hours were erratic, beginning frequently at 11 A.M. instead of the usual 9:30 A.M., and his lunch hour on many occasions was spent outside the building and kept him away until 4 P.M. He rarely attended United Nations parties.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 4, 1971]

K.G.B.'S EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE A SPY'S DEFLECTION ARE OUTLINED

(By Benjamin Welles)

WASHINGTON, October 3.—Within hours of the defection of a Soviet spy—such as Oleg Lyalin who defected to Britain last month—the Soviet K.G.B., or State Security Committee, begins immediate, sweeping protective measures within and outside the Soviet Union, experts here say.

The countermeasures have been worked out over 50 years of Soviet espionage experience and are effective, the experts say. They have a two-fold aim. One is to obscure the gravity of the defection in the eyes of international public opinion by quickly publishing counter-charges of "provocation" or "cold war" tactics.

The second aim is to alert subagents or contacts of the defector to disappear until the storm blows over. This behind-the-scenes effort is a race against time between the K.G.B. and Western security services.

The charges made the other day by H.A.R. (Kim) Philby in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia contending that at least seven British diplomats with Mideast experience are intelligence officers are viewed here as part of the intelligence technique known as "disinformation."

MUDGING THE WATERS

"It's essentially muddying the waters, stirring up countercharges that attract headlines and divert attention from the defector," one specialist said. "Kim Philby is very experienced. He's giving the K.G.B. advice."

Philby, who became a Communist in 1934 during his undergraduate days at Cambridge University, defected to the Soviet Union in 1963. He penetrated British intelligence in World War II and later rose to be head of its most sensitive section—the one working to control Soviet spies.

In 1949 Philby was sent to the British Embassy here as liaison officer with United States intelligence services. Soon after, through a high Soviet defector, the Central Intelligence Agency learned that Philby was a double agent. It was not until 1963, however, that he finally fled to the Soviet Union.

On Aug. 18 this year, Philby granted an interview to a Czechoslovak journalist in Moscow. Extracts from his forthcoming book on espionage were published. It is believed here that the K.G.B., then knew—or suspected—that Lyalin, who was drinking heavily, might be exposed and so used the Philby interview as a veiled warning to British intelligence.

"He knows a lot of secrets and he can cook up a lot," a former acquaintance of Philby said. "This may have been a warning to London to leave the Russians alone—or he'd sing."

It now appears to experts here that Philby is playing a major role in "orchestrating" the K.G.B.'s disinformation chorus against Britain. One source noted that Philby had accused the British Government of barring 105 suspected Soviet spies to "slow down the process of relaxation of tension in Europe."

Apart from the disinformation campaign when a Soviet spy defects, the experts say, the K.G.B. makes an exhaustive "damage report."

DEFECTOR'S HISTORY EXAMINED

When a defector is known or suspected, orders are flashed to the K.G.B. "residents" or

spy chiefs, in key foreign posts to "neutralize" potential damage, the experts say.

In K.G.B. headquarters in Moscow hundreds of personnel are apparently drafted to examine the defector's history—who recommended him for employment, his family, friends, colleagues and background.

"Every file a defector ever signed for is examined to find out what he may have had access to," one source said.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 3, 1971]
SURVEY INDICATES INCREASE IN ESPIONAGE BY THE SOVIET

(By Benjamin Welles)

WASHINGTON, October 2.—Soviet espionage appears to be growing around the world—particularly in the West—while Western and Soviet officials negotiate about reducing tensions.

This is indicated in a survey conducted by New York Times correspondents in 20 capitals, plus extensive interviews here with American security officials. The survey was prompted by recent disclosures of persistent, large and expanding Soviet espionage in Britain.

In a countermove that Western security experts here had been expecting, the Soviet Government amplified charges today against the British intelligence service.

Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, asserted that the British had sent agents to Moscow disguised as businessmen, tourists, journalists and scientists. Some businessmen and tourists were identified, but not journalists or scientists.

Last week, Prime Minister Heath, in a crack-down unprecedented in peacetime for its severity and speed, ordered 90 Soviet diplomats of a total of 550 in Britain expelled. He also refused re-entry permits for 15 others. All were accused of espionage.

Since 1960, the State Department says, the United States has expelled 11 Soviet officials attached to the Embassy here and 11 others attached to the United Nations in New York on espionage charges.

OFFICIALS ARE HEARTENED

The British action has heartened Western security officials, particularly Americans—some of whom have feared in recent years that wide publicized efforts at détente between East and West would lead, also, to lower security standards.

"The British showed guts," one said recently. "I sometimes wish we could be as porky about this sort of thing as the British."

The United States reportedly remains the main target of Soviet espionage. Since the mid-1950's, when the K.G.B., the Soviet state security agency and chief espionage arm, had a few hundred agents in the United States with diplomatic or other official accreditation immunizing them from imprisonment here, the number is believed to have expanded steadily.

Currently the legal Soviet presence in the United States comprises 1,380 men, women and children. About half of the men are considered by the security services to be agents of the K.G.B. or G.R.U., the military intelligence. Many Soviet wives here are also believed to work for one of the services.

CONCENTRATION IN NEW YORK

In addition to these, United States authorities say, there are "illegals" Soviet agents under deep cover. If caught, they are liable to imprisonment. Their precise numbers are unknown but normally they are considered to exceed the "legals" by far.

The main concentrations of Soviet citizens officially in the United States are said to include 400 to 500 in the Soviet Embassy and its branches here; 800 to 900 in the New York area, including 120 to 150 at the Soviet Mission; 200 to 300 in Washington, D.C., working as international civil servants in the United Nations; 10 to 20 at the Amtorg trade delegation; 10 to 20 working jointly for

Aeroflot and Intourist plus 10 to 20 correspondents for Tass and other Soviet news agencies.

"There are also hundreds each year who come in and out on temporary duty to attend trade, cultural and scientific conferences," said an American security expert. "Many are known, identified, K.G.B. or G.R.U. officers."

Other points throughout in the survey and interviews were the following:

The K.G.B., and to a lesser extent the G.R.U., are reported to be expanding steadily through West Europe, in the Middle East and, especially, in Latin America.

Career Soviet intelligence officers have been observing moving with diplomatic immunity between countries, attached at various times and for varying periods to embassies, cultural, trade and scientific missions or to the United Nations. When caught spying and expelled they often turn up in another country—or even reappear years later as accredited Soviet diplomats in the country from which they were expelled.

Vladimir P. Pavlichenko, who since 1966 has been director of external relations in the United Nations Office of Public Information, is a veteran K.G.B. officer, American security experts say. They report that he travels extensively throughout the United States, Latin America and Western Europe and often returns to Moscow on home leave. One of his key assignments, has been they say, to cultivate American scientists and he has frequently attended the Pugwash meetings sponsored by the Ohio Industrialist, Cyrus Eaton, to promote United States-Soviet scientific exchange.

Since the K.G.B. and 27 other Communist intelligence services met in Moscow in 1959 to coordinate activities on a basis of full equality, experts report, there has been a marked development in Soviet "disinformation," or strategic deception. For instance, they say, whenever Soviet intelligence activities are uncovered there is a flurry of inspired statements, speeches or leaks to the press charging that Western security services are reviving the cold war or sowing discord between the East and West. Yesterday, for example, Harold R. (Kim) Philby, the veteran British K.G.B. agent who fled to the Soviet Union in 1963, charged that the British Government had expelled Soviet officials to "slow down European détente."

The K.G.B., an arm of the Soviet Communist party's central committee, headed by Yuri Andropov, a close ally of that party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, dominates Soviet foreign operations, security men say. "There's no question about Andropov asking Gromyko for a number of cover-slots in some embassy or tourist office," one said. "The Central Committee tells Andropov it wants expanded coverage of the U.S., British or West Germany or some other area—and Andropov tells Gromyko how many slots he'll need."

SOME STATIONED IN UNITED STATES

Among those ordered to leave Britain last week, some have been stationed in the United States. Following are their names and their reported espionage affiliations.

Boris G. Kolodny, a G.R.U. agent who was a First Secretary in the Embassy here from 1958 to 1963.

Vladimir G. Filatov, a K.G.B. agent in the Amtorg office in New York from 1962-1966.

Sergei N. Golubev, a K.G.B. agent in the Soviet delegation to the United Nations in 1961 and 1963-1964.

Vsevolod N. Generalov, a G.R.U. agent who served in the Soviet air attaché's office here from 1969 to 1971, when he was expelled for

Vyacheslav A. Yasakov, a K.G.B. agent who attended Cornell University in 1965-1966.

Ivan P. Azarov, a K.B.G. agent who was a

Third Secretary of Embassy here from 1951 to 1954 and who returned as Second Secretary in 1961-1966.

Richard K. Vaygaukas, a K.G.B. agent attached to the United Nations Secretariat in New York from 1960 to 1963.

Emilia A. Petrovicheva, a K.G.B. agent whose husband, also employed by the K.G.B., served in the Embassy here from 1962-1966.

WEST GERMANY FIRST

Of all countries affected by Soviet espionage, West Germany ranks first, in the opinion of career experts here. At least 170 Soviet "legals" have been identified. To aid them they are believed to have 10,000 "illegals" working under various covers.

The K.G.B. "resident," or chief, in Bonn is said to be Ivan J. Salzev, a tall, slender man in his mid-50's with a mustache and a waxy complexion. Despite his reticence, he is well-known to Western intelligence services. He is listed officially as First Secretary of the Embassy.

His deputy, Grman I. Vladimirov, listed as a political counselor, has specialized for 20 years in German-speaking posts and served the K.G.B. in Vienna from 1955-1958. Another K.G.B. agent, Aleksandr Bogomolov, is listed as press attaché in Bonn.

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

In recent years the K.G.B. has developed "agents of influence" among friendly West Germans, whose task is to penetrate and influence trade unions, industrial and cultural institutions.

In France, the number of Soviet "legals" has doubled in the last 10 years and now nearing 1,000. There are 81 accredited to the Soviet Embassy in Paris, 350 to 500 under various other covers plus a Soviet Bloc contingent totaling 500.

PLAYED DOWN BY FRENCH

Although the Quai d'Orsay has sought in the interest of French-Soviet amity to play down espionage cases, at least 53 have reached the French courts in eight years. They have involved east Germans, Czechoslovakians, Russians, Poles, Rumanians and Yugoslavs.

In Italy, which has a Communist party of 1.5 million, the largest in West Europe, there are about 50 K.G.B. "legals" in the Embassy in Rome plus 200 in other Soviet missions. Since the British round-up, the Italian counter-espionage service, has been tightening its surveillance.

Mexico has long been a major Soviet operations center. There are 80 Soviet diplomats in Mexico City, of whom 65 are suspected agents.

Five Soviet nationals were expelled by Mexico in March.

BEIRUT REGARDED AS CENTER

In the Middle East Beirut is generally regarded as the chief Soviet operations center for the Arab world. The Soviet now is estimated to have 25,000 military and economic "technicians" in the area.

A senior Syrian officer who defected to Jordan in 1966 reported that all these technicians must report regularly to the K.G.B.

Israel is believed to be a prime target for Soviet espionage. However, the lack of diplomatic relations deprives the K.G.B. of legal cover. Moreover, the Israeli security service is regarded here as first class.

Recently Victor Louis, who is considered a K.G.B. "disinformation" specialist, and who appears to be a journalist and tipster for Western newsmen in Moscow, visited Israel and proposed closer ties. His proposals are said to have fallen on deaf ears.

Soviet espionage in Japan is said by New York Times correspondents to be largely ineffective. There are reported to be 41 Soviet "legals" in the Embassy plus 40 in other assignments, but political developments in Japan are widely reported in the press and economic statistics are also publicly available.

Despite occasional lapses, the K.G.B. is respected by Western security services.

"The K.G.B. is an underpinning of the Soviet regime—close to the Central Committee, free of criticism, furnished with enormous funds and manpower," said a Western expert. "No Western service stands a chance of being as strong as a totalitarian state service. Only an informed public opinion can even the balance."

[From the New York Times, Sept. 25, 1971]
TEXTS OF BRITISH NOTE TO SOVIET ON SPYING
AND OF HOME LETTERS

Following are the texts of a British note to the Soviet Union on espionage activities, as made public in London and transmitted by Reuters, and of two letters from Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, to Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, as transmitted by the London bureau of The New York Times:

BRITISH NOTE

When Mr. Gromyko visited London in October, 1970, he spoke of the desirability of improving Anglo-Soviet relations.

It is the sincere wish of Her Majesty's Government to bring about such an improvement.

There is, however, one matter of importance which has repeatedly caused friction in Anglo-Soviet relations. This is the scale of intelligence, gathering activities by Soviet officials in this country. This subject was raised with Mr. Gromyko by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, first in conversation in London and subsequently in a letter dated 3 December 1970, written at Mr. Gromyko's suggestion, and in a further letter dated 4 August 1971.

These letters have not been answered, nor even acknowledged.

Meanwhile, inadmissible activities by Soviet officials in Britain have continued. During the last 12 months a number of Soviet officials have been required to leave the country after being detected in such activities. During the same period it has been decided not to issue visas to a number of officials nominated to Soviet establishments in the United Kingdom on account of their previous activities.

The staffs of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet trade delegation, which form the two largest elements in the Soviet official establishment in Britain, far outnumber the British officials working in the Soviet Union.

Her Majesty's Government have tolerated the growth of these establishments. They have not sought to bargain increases in the Soviet establishments, in this country against increases in the British establishment in the U.S.S.R., nor have they, sought to establish any fixed relationship between the Soviet commercial establishment in this country and the growth of British exports to the Soviet Union. Evidence has, however, been accumulating that this tolerance has been systematically abused.

This abuse is a matter of serious concern to Her Majesty's Government as a direct threat to the security of this country. Moreover, the recurring need to request the withdrawal of Soviet officials from this country, or to refuse visas to certain officials selected for service in this country, imposes strains on Anglo-Soviet relations. So do unjustified acts of Soviet retaliation such as the recent expulsions of Mr. Miller, Mr. Nicholson and Mr. Jackson.

The Soviet Government can hardly fail to be conscious of the contradiction between their advocacy of a conference on European security and the scale of the operations against the security of this country which Soviet officials and agents controlled by them have conducted. Her Majesty's Government, you will recall, invited the Soviet delegation to London for the preparation of a conference on European security begins.

The Soviet Embassy is therefore requested to arrange for the persons named on the attached list [not made public], all of whom have been concerned in intelligence activities, to leave Britain within two weeks from the date of this aide-mémoire.

Henceforth:

(A) The numbers of officials in: (I) the Soviet Embassy; (II) the Soviet trade delegation, and (III) all other Soviet organizations in Great Britain will not be permitted to rise above the levels at which they will stand after the withdrawal of the persons named in the attached list.

(B) If a Soviet official is required to leave the country as a result of his having been deleted in intelligence activities, the permitted level in that category will be reduced by one.

The Soviet Embassy is also asked to take note that the Soviet citizens named on the second list attached [not made public], who are believed to have left the country but still hold valid reentry visas, will not be permitted to return to Britain on account of their participation in intelligence activities.

HOME'S FIRST LETTER

You will remember that on Oct. 28 at the Soviet Embassy in London, I mentioned to you the case of F. D. Kudashkin. As you requested, I have gone carefully into this case. F. D. Kudashkin's activities in the United States were referred to in court proceedings which were reported at length in The New York Times of March 9, 1965. I enclose a copy of that report.

If you will read it, you will certainly understand why my colleagues and I regard F. D. Kudashkin as unacceptable for any appointment in this country. I hope you will agree that in the interests of our relations, it would be better that we should both regard the visa application made on his behalf as having lapsed.

The case of F. D. Kudashkin is by no means isolated, and it is with regret that, after the enjoyable and constructive discussions I had with you in London, I find myself constrained to write to you about the scale and nature of the intelligence activities conducted by Soviet officials in this country and about the frequency of the attempts which have been made in recent months to introduce into this country officials who, in the past, have been engaged in such activities.

In 1970 alone we have refused visas to more than half a dozen Soviet officials assigned to this country because we had every reason to suspect, on the basis of what we know about their previous activities, that if they were admitted to this country they would not restrict themselves to work which we regard as legitimate and conducive to the maintenance and development of good relations.

Most of the men to whom we have refused visas had been appointed to the Soviet trade delegation. I know that the Soviet trade delegation is not directly subordinated to your ministry, but since you, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., are concerned with all matters which affect the foreign relations of your country. I wish to invite your attention to the number of cases which have come to light of late in which members of the Soviet trade delegation have been found to have engaged in totally inadmissible activities.

This year alone, permission to stay in this country has had to be withdrawn from four members of the Soviet trade delegation. Since I had occasion to speak to you about F. D. Kudashkin, two new cases, one of them particularly serious, involving members of the Soviet trade delegation, have been brought to my attention. In the first case, a visa application had recently been submitted for A. P. Safronov, whom we know to have engaged in inadmis-

sible activities when he worked at the Soviet trade delegation between 1962 and 1966.

The competent Soviet authorities will be able to give you full information about the various kinds of inadmissible activities which have been conducted from the Soviet trade delegation. They have included the running of agents, instruction in the use of clandestine techniques, the offer and payment of considerable sums of money to persons resident in this country either to suborn them or to secure their help in obtaining classified information (both official and commercial) or commodities subject to embargo or other restrictions.

You will be aware that Her Majesty's previous Government felt compelled to place a limit on the growth of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in 1968. Even so, since last August we have had to request the withdrawal of L. Y. Yeshukin, and the attempt to support F. D. Kudashkin to the embassy has reawakened old suspicions.

When you were in London, you said that Anglo-Soviet relation could not be described as bad, but what more could be done for their development and improvement. In this letter I have indicated a field which is becoming an increasing obstacle to the development of our relation, and with regard to which the kind of improvement of which you spoke would be most welcome.

The representations which Sir D. Greenhill made on this subject to Vice Minister Kozirev [of the Soviet Foreign Ministry] earlier this year appear, from subsequent developments, to have been ignored. I hope that this personal letter to you will be handled in the spirit of your opening remarks to the Prime Minister and myself during your visit to London.

HOME'S SECOND LETTER

I have received with interest Sir Denis Greenhill's reports of his conversations with Mr. Kozirev and yourself, in which you both referred to the allegedly hostile and provocative activities of the "British special services" against the Soviet Union and its citizens and against Soviet agencies in the United Kingdom, and in which you argued that these alleged activities did not contribute to the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

Since you have raised this matter, I think it right to tell you that I see the situation in a very different light.

The Soviet Union conducts espionage against Great Britain on a large scale. Even if I were to mention only those cases which have become public knowledge during the last few years, the list would be a long one.

Many more cases, some of them very serious, are known to me and doubtless to you also. Governments which engage in intelligence activities on such a scale as this much expect that the authorities in the countries attacked will take such precautions and counter measures as may be open to them. I do not accept your contention that, in the interests of Anglo-Soviet relations, Her Majesty's Government should abstain from taking measures to prevent, limit or inhibit the espionage conducted by Soviet officials on such an extensive scale. It is this which places a strain upon our relations.

I take it that you yourself are fully informed of the scale of Soviet intelligence activities in this country.

You are no doubt aware that the total number of Soviet officials on the staff of Soviet diplomatic, commercial and other organizations has now risen to more than 500, and you are presumably able to ascertain what proportion of these are intelligence officers. I would ask you to consider, however, how the situation must appear to the Foreign Minister of the country against which all this activity is directed. I would further point out that the number of Soviet officials in the United Kingdom exceeds the number of Soviet offi-

ficials in any comparable country and indeed even in the United States (excluding the U.N.).

With the information at my disposal I find it hard to interpret the remarks made by Mr. Kozirev and yourself as other than a suggestion that Her Majesty's Government should allow these intelligence agents of yours to conduct their activities in the United Kingdom unhampered lest Anglo-Soviet relations should suffer. I consider this a proposition which it is unreasonable for any government to make to another, whatever the state of their relations.

As an example of the present situation I will mention one particular case. It is in no way exceptional, but it happens to be the most recent.

Last month Her Majesty's Embassy in Moscow received an application for a visa from a man named B. G. Glushchenko, together with the statement that he had been nominated to the post of First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in London.

This man was in Britain from 1964 to 1968. At that time he was described as the representative of Aviaexport at the Soviet trade delegation. Mr. Glushchenko's activities, however, had little to do with the sale of aircraft. He came to our notice on various occasions: For example, he offered a large sum of money to a British businessman if he would obtain details of certain British military equipment. This is the man whom some Soviet organization has nominated to serve as First Secretary at your embassy in London. You will hardly be surprised to learn that I am not prepared to permit such a person to return to this country.

This is not the first time that I have had occasion to bring such matters to your attention. I spoke to you on the subject during your visit to London in October, 1970. I did so in a manner which would have permitted the question to be pursued in a non-political way. You suggested that I should write you a letter, and on Oct. 3, 1970, I did so. To this date, to my surprise, I have received no reply, nor even an acknowledgment. Meanwhile inadmissible Soviet activities in this country continue unabated.

I ask you to reflect upon this and to consider the extent to which these activities are obstructing the development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

I note that Mr. Kozirev tried to obscure the central issue, namely the scale and nature of your Government's intelligence activities in this country, by dragging in the irrelevant question of the few Soviet citizens who, at various times, have sought and received permission to stay in this country and by repeating a number of unwarranted accusations against the behavior of the British authorities. The accusations which referred to past incidents were dealt with at the time in separate exchanges. As for the Soviet citizens, I again assure you that any Soviet citizen in this country who decides to return to the U.S.S.R. is free to do so.

I trust that you will now feel able to reply to my original letter and to this one, which I send in the hope that you will say that you are ready immediately to terminate such activities.